Competition law in labor markets has recently become one of the most dynamic and rapidly evolving areas of antitrust enforcement. For decades, one of the primary focuses of antimonopoly enforcement has been consumer welfare.
Accordingly, competition authorities traditionally measured competition primarily through product prices – the prices of goods on supermarket shelves, fuel prices at gas stations, fruit and vegetable prices in markets, and similar indicators. Competition law in labor markets is increasingly becoming a central focus of modern antitrust enforcement across major jurisdictions.
However, in 2025, the decision of the European Commission to fine Delivery Hero and Glovo €329 million significantly altered the trajectory of antitrust enforcement and shifted it onto new tracks. thus In recent years, competition law in labor markets has emerged as a new frontier in antitrust policy and regulatory scrutiny.
Until recently, agreements affecting the labor market were largely ignored within the framework of competition law.
Everything changed when the European Commission imposed the first major fine on two giants in the food delivery and courier services sector – Delivery Hero and Glovo.
The basis for the fine was an agreement between the two companies under which they undertook mutual obligations not to hire each other’s employees and to set salary caps for their workers.
Such restrictions on employee recruitment are commonly referred to in legal literature and practice as “No-Poach Agreements.”
In many business cultures – including in some cases in Georgia – such arrangements have occasionally been treated as a normal business practice. The growing importance of competition law in labor markets reflects a broader shift in how regulators address competitive dynamics beyond traditional product markets.
However, the European Commission has now classified such conduct as a violation of antimonopoly law, which in turn carries very serious financial sanctions.
A similar approach may soon be confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which is currently examining a case involving a comparable issue.
The case concerns an agreement between Portuguese football clubs during the pandemic, under which clubs agreed not to recruit each other’s players.
If the Court concludes that such an agreement constitutes a restriction of competition by object, meaning a cartel-type arrangement, then any similar agreement – whether in the technology sector, construction industry, or sports – could automatically be considered illegal, regardless of whether it caused actual economic harm.
In addition, the European Commission has already launched dawn raids in the data center construction sector, where the suspicion again relates to No-Poach agreements.
At the same time, national competition authorities across Europe are becoming increasingly aggressive in this area. thus Competition law in labor markets is transforming the way authorities evaluate agreements between companies related to hiring, wages, and employee mobility.
For example, the Polish antimonopoly authority has also intensified its enforcement activities regarding similar practices.
As a result, the European labor market can no longer be considered outside the scope of competition law enforcement.
Following these precedents, it is entirely possible that competition authorities will increasingly focus not only on how companies sell or purchase products, but also on how they recruit and employ personnel.
Considering that the enforcement of competition law in Georgia largely follows European legal practice, it cannot be ruled out that a similar regulatory reality may soon emerge in Georgia as well.
However, there is one important aspect.
According to Article 1(4)(a) of the Law of Georgia on Competition, the law does not apply to “labour relations.”
In theory, this provision could mitigate some of the risks described above in the Georgian context.
Nevertheless, given the vague wording of this provision, relying solely on it would not be an ideal solution.
For this reason, businesses should consider several strategic steps:
1. HR Compliance Review
The HR department should become an important component of legal audits concerning competition compliance.
2. Control of Communications
Any communication with competitors regarding salary benchmarking or recruitment practices must be strictly controlled.
3. Review of Contracts
Partnership agreements should be reviewed to identify and monitor clauses that restrict the recruitment or hiring of employees.
4. Information Exchange Protocols
Strict internal rules should be introduced regarding the exchange of information within industry associations about average salaries or similar employment-related data.
Conclusion
Competition law in labor markets is gaining increasing attention as regulators begin to scrutinize hiring practices and wage-setting agreements between competing firms.The expansion of competition law in labor markets signals a significant shift in antitrust enforcement from purely consumer-focused analysis toward the protection of fair employment competition. Recent enforcement actions show that competition law in labor markets is becoming an essential tool for addressing practices such as no-poach agreements and wage-fixing arrangements. Ultimately, competition law is gradually leaving its traditional sphere and entering a new, more dynamic stage, where its priority is no longer limited to the protection of consumers, but increasingly extends to employees as well.
